The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2425zbMath0910.90120OpenAlexW2000171849MaRDI QIDQ1270757

Giuseppe Lopomo

Publication date: 19 April 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fa934e572d0c129f44201dfa7972470adddbc7b1

zbMATH Keywords

English auctionsimple sequential auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION ⋮ Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ The effectiveness of English auctions. ⋮ Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions ⋮ Optimality and robustness of the English auction ⋮ Auctions with a buy price ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

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