Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
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Publication:1270762
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2416zbMath0910.90289OpenAlexW2031974841MaRDI QIDQ1270762
Publication date: 3 November 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2416
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