Payoff continuity in incomplete information games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2418zbMath0910.90288OpenAlexW1968789091MaRDI QIDQ1270763

K. Appert

Publication date: 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1193.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items

Continuity Properties of Value Functions in Information Structures for Zero-Sum and General Games and Stochastic Teams ⋮ Informational robustness of competitive equilibria. ⋮ Value‐based distance between information structures ⋮ THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING ⋮ Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change ⋮ Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games ⋮ Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games ⋮ The topology of information on the space of probability measures over Polish spaces ⋮ Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information ⋮ Non-additive anonymous games ⋮ A theorem of the maximin and applications to Bayesian zero-sum games ⋮ Payoff continuity in incomplete information games: a comment ⋮ Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.

Cites Work

• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Lower hemicontinuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information