Regulation of a risk averse firm

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0639zbMath0912.90079OpenAlexW2144994854MaRDI QIDQ1272618

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean-Charles Rochet

Publication date: 3 January 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0639

zbMATH Keywords

bunchingoptimal contractrisk-averse firmscost-plus contractsLaffont-Tirole regulation model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Impact of price cap regulation on supply chain contracting between two monopolists ⋮ Competitive contracts with productive information gathering ⋮ Common agency with risk-averse agent ⋮ Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case ⋮ Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents ⋮ Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach ⋮ Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment ⋮ Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Value of communication in agencies
• Monopoly and product quality
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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