Regulation of a risk averse firm
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Publication:1272618
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0639zbMath0912.90079OpenAlexW2144994854MaRDI QIDQ1272618
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean-Charles Rochet
Publication date: 3 January 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0639
Related Items (8)
Impact of price cap regulation on supply chain contracting between two monopolists ⋮ Competitive contracts with productive information gathering ⋮ Common agency with risk-averse agent ⋮ Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case ⋮ Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents ⋮ Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach ⋮ Regulating a firm under adverse selection and moral hazard in uncertain environment ⋮ Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters
Cites Work
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- Value of communication in agencies
- Monopoly and product quality
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- On Moral Hazard and Insurance
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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