Efficient private production of public goods under common agency

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0637zbMath0912.90069OpenAlexW2000311537MaRDI QIDQ1272620

Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 3 January 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0637

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriapublic goodPareto inefficient equilibriaprivate, profit-maximizing firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites Work

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Cores of convex games
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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