Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0675zbMath0912.90078OpenAlexW1974235909MaRDI QIDQ1272628

Claude d'Aspremont, Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Publication date: 7 March 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/00c65e6b85aec28be045f25000a615fade43936c

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designfolk theoremefficient partnershipsenforcement mechanismsstochastic outcome functionsteam moral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation

Cites Work

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• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

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