Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview
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Publication:1272628
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0675zbMath0912.90078OpenAlexW1974235909MaRDI QIDQ1272628
Claude d'Aspremont, Louis-André Gérard-Varet
Publication date: 7 March 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/00c65e6b85aec28be045f25000a615fade43936c
mechanism designfolk theoremefficient partnershipsenforcement mechanismsstochastic outcome functionsteam moral hazard
Related Items (4)
Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation
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- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
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