Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2444zbMath0915.90079OpenAlexW1993939398MaRDI QIDQ1272653

Olivier Gossner

Publication date: 11 April 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2444

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriacommunication equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (9)

Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals ⋮ A simple model of secure public communication ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Comparison of information structures ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Incentives and the structure of communication ⋮ A commitment folk theorem ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions ⋮ Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Cites Work

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• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• One-shot public mediated talk
• Internal correlation in repeated games
• Mediated talk
• Mental poker with three or more players
• Universal Mechanisms
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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