Are two a good representative for many?

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2456zbMath0913.90083OpenAlexW2090024711MaRDI QIDQ1272654

Rudolf Kerschbamer, Nina Maderner

Publication date: 3 January 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b9605e3c083b3fce14a742383156d3c702453b1e

zbMATH Keywords

poolingscreening modeltype-dependent reservation utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (4)

Contractual distortions in a market with frictions ⋮ Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information ⋮ Newsvendor competition under asymmetric cost information ⋮ Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation

Cites Work

• The use of an agent in a signalling model
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Multiproduct Duopolists
• Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement

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