Reinterpreting arbitration's narcotic effect: An experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0633zbMath0912.90287OpenAlexW3123808751MaRDI QIDQ1272976

Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok

Publication date: 2 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0633

zbMATH Keywords

learningarbitrationrepeated bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment ⋮ Nonbinding recommendations: The relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes ⋮ The effects of beliefs versus risk attitude on bargaining outcomes ⋮ Bargaining outcomes with double-offer arbitration

Cites Work

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• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data
• Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information
• An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems
• On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data

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