Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions
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Publication:1272977
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0627zbMath0912.90092OpenAlexW2144401500MaRDI QIDQ1272977
Charles R. Plott, Kay-Yut Chen
Publication date: 2 December 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-142425505
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