On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0626zbMath0912.90293OpenAlexW2117671832MaRDI QIDQ1272978

Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young

Publication date: 2 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0626

zbMATH Keywords

learningcyclescoordination gamesfictitious playcoordination gameShapley example

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

SOPHISTICATED ENFORCEMENT AND ADAPTIVE OFFENDERS, On the convergence of beliefs within populations in games with learning, Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium., Fictitious play with incomplete learning, Two more classes of games with the continuous-time fictitious play property, Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player, Fictitious play in \(2\times n\) games, Evolutionary game dynamics, Brown's original fictitious play, Economists' models of learning, SOLVING LARGE GAMES WITH SIMULATED FICTITIOUS PLAY

Cites Work

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