Comparative statics in first price auctions

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0635zbMath0912.90094OpenAlexW2046467812MaRDI QIDQ1272979

Bernard Lebrun

Publication date: 2 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0635

zbMATH Keywords

first price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Disincentives for cost-reducing investment ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity ⋮ Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests ⋮ How to translate results from auctions to procurements ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Asymmetric price-benefits auctions ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations

Cites Work

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• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs