Evolutionary equilibria: Characterization theorems and their implications

DOI10.1023/A:1005083323183zbMath0912.90281OpenAlexW1593787111MaRDI QIDQ1273247

Jonathan Bendor, Piotr Swistak

Publication date: 6 December 1998

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005083323183

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryiterated prisoner's dilemmaevolution of cooperationTFTevolutionary equilibriaevolutionary stable strategiestit for tatIPD

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Generalized backward induction: justification for a folk algorithm

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