An empirical comparison of probabilistic coalition structure theories in 3-person sidepayment games

DOI10.1023/A:1005035407253zbMath0913.90276OpenAlexW1577234102MaRDI QIDQ1273925

H. Andrew Michener, Daniel J. Myers

Publication date: 6 January 1999

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005035407253

zbMATH Keywords

kernel3-person sidepayment gamescentral-union theoryequal excess modelMyerson-Shapley solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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