The strategic advantage of being less skilled

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00072-XzbMath0914.90062OpenAlexW2062320098WikidataQ127629638 ScholiaQ127629638MaRDI QIDQ1274184

Lorenz Nett, Wolfgang Buchholz, Wolfgang Peters

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00072-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

• The uniqueness of the subscription equilibrium with endogenous labor supply

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