The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00009-8zbMath0913.90285WikidataQ127898214 ScholiaQ127898214MaRDI QIDQ1274207

B. Curtis Eaton, Jasmina Arifovic

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

genetic algorithmsender/receiver game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents
• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Auctions with artificial adaptive agents
• Coordination via genetic learning
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication

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