On stable social laws and qualitative equilibria

DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00033-2zbMath0909.68165MaRDI QIDQ1274287

Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social lawsqualitative decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computing methodologies and applications (68U99) Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20)

Related Items

Choosing social laws for multi-agent systems: Minimality and simplicity

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