The codetermined firm in oligopoly

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00168-2zbMath0912.90040OpenAlexW2066673857MaRDI QIDQ1274651

Kornelius Kraft

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00168-2

zbMATH Keywords

duopolywelfareprofitsemploymentcodetermination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

Cites Work

• Unions and strategic managerial incentives
• The relative profitability of Nash bargaining on the labour demand curve or the contract curve
• Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry

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