Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00141-4zbMath0911.90131MaRDI QIDQ1274663

Rohan Pitchford

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmoral hazardlimited liability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty ⋮ Salience bias and overwork ⋮ Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment ⋮ Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: punishment or rent extraction? ⋮ The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability ⋮ Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm ⋮ Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Management of Innovation

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