Why Gödel's theorem cannot refute computationalism
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Publication:1274689
DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00052-6zbMath0908.68057DBLPjournals/ai/LaForteHF98OpenAlexW2001389108WikidataQ56060645 ScholiaQ56060645MaRDI QIDQ1274689
Kenneth M. Ford, Patrick J. Hayes, Geoffrey L. LaForte
Publication date: 12 January 1999
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(98)00052-6
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