A new axiomatization of the core of games with transferable utility

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00107-4zbMath0914.90278OpenAlexW2158669678MaRDI QIDQ1275112

Mark Voorneveld, Anne van den Nouweland

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00107-4

zbMATH Keywords

reduced gamesaxiomatization of the coregames with transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (16)

Max-consistency, complement-consistency and the core of fuzzy games ⋮ Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games ⋮ Feasibility-free axiomatization of the core and its non-empty extension ⋮ Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency ⋮ An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ Axiomatizing core extensions ⋮ Characterizing cautious choice ⋮ Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games ⋮ A note on the core: minimal conversely consistent enlargement ⋮ Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations ⋮ The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results ⋮ The truncated core for games with upper bounds ⋮ Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form ⋮ MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE ⋮ On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions

Cites Work

• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• On the reduced game property and its converse

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