Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00098-6zbMath0914.90277MaRDI QIDQ1275113

Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dominant strategiescoalition-proof equilibriastrategy proof mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

A survey of static and dynamic potential games ⋮ An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey ⋮ Immunity to credible deviations from the truth ⋮ Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? ⋮ When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Remarks on Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled payoffs
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Voting by Committees
• Incentives in Teams

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