On the uniqueness of fully informative rational expectations equilibria

DOI10.1007/S001990050240zbMath0922.90023OpenAlexW3123360124MaRDI QIDQ1275877

Costis Skiadas, Peter M. DeMarzo

Publication date: 4 October 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050240

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommon knowledge equilibriaequilibrium notionsrisk neutral rational expectations equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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