The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding

DOI10.1007/S001990050246zbMath0918.90062OpenAlexW2049741314MaRDI QIDQ1275886

Keith Waehrer

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050246

zbMATH Keywords

bidding mechanismsequential bargainingefficient allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Signal jamming in a sequential auction ⋮ A sequential auction-bargaining procurement model

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