Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model
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Publication:1276116
DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.2450zbMath0916.90293OpenAlexW2087408416MaRDI QIDQ1276116
Publication date: 30 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/18bf63a6c1f88a61476acec95b53d587584fa85e
Related Items (5)
On games of strategic experimentation ⋮ Learning in society ⋮ Endogenous supply of fiat money ⋮ Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model ⋮ Stable repeated strategies for information exchange between two autonomous agents
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