Coordination in auctions with entry

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.2452zbMath0916.90071OpenAlexW2052015334MaRDI QIDQ1276117

Colin M. Campbell

Publication date: 30 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.2452

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriapreplay communicationself-enforcing bidder coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Auctions with entry and resale ⋮ Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction ⋮ Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs ⋮ Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs ⋮ Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Auctions with entry
• Search mechanisms
• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
• A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding*

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