Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2443zbMath0922.90145OpenAlexW2040897362MaRDI QIDQ1276118

Arthur J. Robson, Srihari Govindan

Publication date: 4 October 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2443

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Forward induction and public randomization
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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