Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
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Publication:1276120
DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2447zbMath0916.90066OpenAlexW1981454538MaRDI QIDQ1276120
Antonio Romero-Medina, José Alcalde, David Pérez-Castrillo
Publication date: 30 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/220847
Related Items (20)
The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically ⋮ One-to-many non-cooperative matching games ⋮ A generalized assignment game ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Profit-maximizing matchmaker ⋮ Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries ⋮ Decentralized job matching ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium ⋮ Decentralized matching: the role of commitment ⋮ Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability ⋮ The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets ⋮ Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems ⋮ A simple selling and buying procedure
Cites Work
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- Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- A market to implement the core
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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