Decentralization and collusion

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2462zbMath0915.90167OpenAlexW2040861955MaRDI QIDQ1277089

Tomas Sjöström, Sandeep Baliga

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1210.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddecentralizationdistribution of surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (12)

Collusion and discrimination in organizations ⋮ Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy ⋮ Salience bias and overwork ⋮ Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting ⋮ Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war ⋮ Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Conflict and Development ⋮ Task scheduling and moral hazard ⋮ Transshipment incentive contracts in a multi-level supply chain ⋮ Mechanism design with collusive supervision ⋮ The optimality of team contracts ⋮ Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting

Cites Work

• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

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