The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2465zbMath0915.90268OpenAlexW1981285810MaRDI QIDQ1277092

Karl H. Schlag, Ross Cressman

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2465

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumperfect informationbackwards inductionfinite extensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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