The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
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Publication:1277092
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2465zbMath0915.90268OpenAlexW1981285810MaRDI QIDQ1277092
Publication date: 16 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2465
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