Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2467zbMath0915.90282OpenAlexW2079418699MaRDI QIDQ1277093

Roberto Serrano, Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102592

zbMATH Keywords

coreNash setNTU gamesNash bargaining theorynon-convex and coalitional problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (10)

Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games ⋮ A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ `Vintage' Nash bargaining without convexity ⋮ Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals ⋮ \(n\)-person non-convex bargaining: efficient proportional solutions ⋮ The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games ⋮ Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core ⋮ An NTU value under complement reduced game ⋮ An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games ⋮ The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games

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