Repeated implementation
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Publication:1277094
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2459zbMath0915.90005OpenAlexW4230862817MaRDI QIDQ1277094
Publication date: 16 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80328/
Related Items
Virtual repeated implementation, One-step-ahead implementation, Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization, Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents, Repeated implementation and complexity considerations, Repeated implementation: a practical characterization, Implementation Theory, Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies, Voluntary implementation, Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents, Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals, Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
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