Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00823-2zbMath0918.90049MaRDI QIDQ1277458

Shinji Ohseto

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessvoluntary participationmechanismscost share rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation ⋮ Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods. ⋮ Cooperative production and efficiency ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies