On the invariance of solutions of finite games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00002-4zbMath0943.91509MaRDI QIDQ1277463

A. J. Vermeulen, M. J. M. Jansen

Publication date: 17 August 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

solutionnormal form game(weakly) invariant solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

Related Items (4)

Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces ⋮ Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts ⋮ An ordinal selection of stable sets in the sense of Hillas ⋮ Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games

Cites Work

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• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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