Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00009-7zbMath0918.90153OpenAlexW2000766046MaRDI QIDQ1277465

Ross Cressman

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00009-7

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityevolutionary dynamicsmonotone selectionadjustment processesevolutionary dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Discrete-time games (91A50)

Related Items (18)

EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH TWO INDEPENDENT DECISIONS ⋮ The emergence of deontological codes in public administration ⋮ Three steps ahead ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Stability of the replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces ⋮ Stability and trembles in extensive-form games ⋮ The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game ⋮ An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Lyapunov functions for time-scale dynamics on Riemannian geometries of the simplex ⋮ A note on best response dynamics. ⋮ On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia ⋮ Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ Replicator Dynamics and Weak Pay-Off Positive Selection Dynamics: An Overview

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