On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00005-XzbMath0915.90007OpenAlexW2083278702MaRDI QIDQ1277472

Maria Tataru, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 27 April 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00005-x

zbMATH Keywords

social choicescoring rulesCondorcetBorda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox, IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report, Complexity and the geometry of voting, Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes, Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules, On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner, The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes, On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules, On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives, The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser, Consequences of reversing preferences, On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data, The stability set as a social choice correspondence., Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cites Work

• On the volume of hyperbolic polyhedra
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
• Geometry of voting
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• On probability models in voting theory