Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00007-3zbMath0915.90277WikidataQ59560873 ScholiaQ59560873MaRDI QIDQ1277475

Endre Boros, Alexander Vasin, Vladimir A. Gurvich

Publication date: 27 April 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitycharacteristic functioncorecoalitionperfect graphcooperative game theorysuperadditivitygeneralized characteristic functionTU-gameseffectivity functiongame formNTU-games\({\mathcal K}\)-coreBondareva-Shapley's theoremMoulin-Peleg's theoremnormal hypergraphScarf's theoremstable family of coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Unnamed Item ⋮ Perfect graphs are kernel solvable ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games ⋮ Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs ⋮ A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions ⋮ Normative conspiracy theory ⋮ Universally balanced combinatorial optimization games

Cites Work

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Cores of partitioning games
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Fractional kernels in digraphs
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Normal hypergraphs and the perfect graph conjecture
• The Core of an N Person Game
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