Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00008-5zbMath0916.90056MaRDI QIDQ1277477

James A. Dearden

Publication date: 6 July 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theorypublic goodsbargainingmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Public goods with congestion ⋮ Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
• Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
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