On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00219-5zbMath0916.90275OpenAlexW2083932384MaRDI QIDQ1277709

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 2 March 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00219-5

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaFinite common payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (10)

Games, graphs and Kirchhoff laws ⋮ Pure Nash equilibria of coordination matrix games ⋮ Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games ⋮ Constructive proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions ⋮ The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses ⋮ The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games ⋮ Nash equilibria of Cauchy-random zero-sum and coordination matrix games ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in random games ⋮ On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games ⋮ Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games

Cites Work

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• Unanimity games and Pareto optimality
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in \(n\)-person games
• The Probability of a Saddlepoint
• The Limit Distribution of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games

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