The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3zbMath0929.91003OpenAlexW2081372027MaRDI QIDQ1278559

Eyal Winter, J. Javier Lasaga, Emilio Calvo

Publication date: 11 January 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueTU gamesbalanced contributionspotential functionlevel structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (31)

A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ Harsanyi support levels solutions ⋮ Solidarity in games with a coalition structure ⋮ The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures ⋮ A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure ⋮ New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property ⋮ Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Owen value ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ On new characterizations of the Owen value ⋮ An implementation of the Owen value. ⋮ Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation ⋮ Additional Properties of the Owen Value ⋮ Games with nested constraints given by a level structure ⋮ Bargaining and membership ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues ⋮ The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom ⋮ On the Owen value and the property of balanced contributions within unions ⋮ The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure ⋮ Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ New axiomatizations of the Owen value ⋮ Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values ⋮ The Owen and Banzhaf–Owen values revisited ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE ⋮ A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Implementation of the levels structure value

Cites Work

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• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

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