Efficiency in correlated equilibrium

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00819-0zbMath0917.90028OpenAlexW2124921218MaRDI QIDQ1278571

Indrajit Ray

Publication date: 26 May 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(96)00819-0

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycorrelated equilibriummechanism designrevelation principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game ⋮ Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Values of games in partition function form
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Posterior efficiency
• A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
• One-shot public mediated talk
• Mediated talk
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

This page was built for publication: Efficiency in correlated equilibrium