Learning, matching, and aggregation
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Publication:1279617
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0647zbMath0915.90284OpenAlexW2152816014MaRDI QIDQ1279617
Publication date: 16 February 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/544
Related Items
A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules, Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment, EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS, Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play, Reinforcement learning in population games, The Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game, Learning in games with unstable equilibria, Evolutionary game dynamics, An economist's perspective on multi-agent learning, Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization, Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game, Entropic penalties in finite games
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