Social learning in a common interest voting game

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0634zbMath0916.90289OpenAlexW1996950315MaRDI QIDQ1279620

Jörgen Wit

Publication date: 16 February 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0634

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic voting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (1)

Rational conformity behavior in social learning promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
• An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
• Social learning in recurring games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• A class of bandit problems yielding myopic optimal strategies
• Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling

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