On Stalnaker's notion of strong rationalizability and Nash equilibrium in perfect information games

DOI10.1023/A:1005090905103zbMath0921.90149OpenAlexW1500290532MaRDI QIDQ1280575

Klaus Nehring, Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date: 17 September 1999

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005090905103

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcounterexamplesstrong rationalizabilityperfect information gamesStalnaker's notion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (4)

Rational beliefs in rationalizability ⋮ Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces ⋮ Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

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