Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall

DOI10.1023/A:1018984703104zbMath0922.90150OpenAlexW127425420MaRDI QIDQ1280594

J. L. Ferreira García, P. Corcho Sánchez

Publication date: 4 October 1999

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018984703104

zbMATH Keywords

infinite gamesstable setsimperfect recallcrediblesemistable partitionsugly sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

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