An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00221-3zbMath0921.90011OpenAlexW2047702353MaRDI QIDQ1285526

Josep E. Peris, M. Carmen Sánchez

Publication date: 28 April 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00221-3

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondencesoligarchiesfixed agendanon-Pareto optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power
• A foundation for Pareto aggregation
• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences
• Independent social choice correspondences
• Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle

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