Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves

DOI10.1007/S001990050266zbMath0918.90145OpenAlexW2055929444MaRDI QIDQ1285899

Ko Nishihara

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050266

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibriumstrong Nash equilibriumcooperation in \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemmastrictly proper equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency

This page was built for publication: Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves