Auctions of heterogeneous objects

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0659zbMath0918.90059OpenAlexW2065388033MaRDI QIDQ1288238

Sushil Bikhchandani

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0659

zbMATH Keywords

simultaneous sealed bid auctionsWalrasian equilibrium allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Principal-agent VCG contracts ⋮ On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms ⋮ Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy ⋮ Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions ⋮ Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient ⋮ On the efficiency of all-pay mechanisms ⋮ Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: issues of efficiency in electricity auctions ⋮ Multiple unit auctions with economies and diseconomies of scale ⋮ Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security ⋮ On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods ⋮ Games played through agents in the laboratory -- a test of Prat \& Rustichini's model ⋮ The package assignment model.

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
• Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
• Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Auctions of Shares
• Communications to the Editor—Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information
• Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions

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