Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0660zbMath0918.90150OpenAlexW2147162491MaRDI QIDQ1288242

Leslie M. Marx

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0660

zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy Nash equilibriumrational playersweakly dominated strategiesadaptive learning process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability ⋮ On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response ⋮ Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies

Cites Work

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• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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