Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0642zbMath0918.90007OpenAlexW2008638374MaRDI QIDQ1288245

Tomas Sjöström

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0642

zbMATH Keywords

renegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Credible implementation
• Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Implementation in perfect equilibria
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms

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